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Abstract 
In Nigeria, the concept of minority has been misconceived and misapplied.  The colonialist classificatory scheme 
of identifying cultural or ethnic minorities and majorities has been excessively adhered to and politicized. This has 
produced politics of exclusion and the concomitant denial of rights, especially to groups considered political 
minorities. This can be couched as the ‘minoritazation’ of cultural, ethnic or even locational groups. In Nigeria, 
such politics of marginalization translates to exclusion from participation of human resources that cannot be 
ignored in the development agenda of the country. To reposition these minorities, a constitutional review aimed at 
restructuring power relations in the country needs to be undertaken. Any honest desire for development of Nigeria 
must cultivate the courage to undertake this politico-social engineering such as other countries like India have 
successfully done. This paper establishes a strong connection between the rights of ethno-cultural and political 
minorities and development in Nigeria through an empirical cataloguing of contribution of minorities to the 
political process in Nigeria.  
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1. Introduction 
In the contemporary world, the most cherished value over which people spend a lot of energies trying to secure or 
trying to protect is rights. Rights, if denied, could amount to disempowerment. Denial of rights amounts to denial 
of space to participate in affairs of the community where one belongs. Experience has shown that minorities are 
most susceptible to losing their rights in a political set up. Losing of such rights amounts to blocking the space of 
participation in any development effort. The withdrawal of participation also means that such energies, knowledge 
and skills of such a minority are no longer channelled towards contributing to development efforts. It is ironical 
that the state system bequeathed by the colonialist engendered the politics of exclusion rather than inclusion. 
Dependence on political parties as the basis for recruitment of leaders is the very practice of the politics of 
exclusion. Indeed, multi- party advocacy became equated with democracy. Painstaking effort was not exerted in 
questioning the basis on which political parties should operate in a given polity. Thus, ‘multi-partism’, before it 
could bring about the room for political participation in Nigeria, became thoroughly abused. First, it encouraged 
ethnic politics by becoming a reason for fissiparous associations based on ethnicity. Second, there was multiplicity 
of groups without good political reason. This situation still obtains in present-day Nigeria, where there are more 
than eighty (80) political parties without any ideological differences between them. Party formation, a practice in 
political exclusion, conceals under it more serious practices of exclusion which is the denial of rights. This very 
denial of rights through ethnicity (Nnoli, 1980) has then led to avoidable strife. Indeed, the Nigerian civil war is 
explained by some (Young, 1979, P.18) on the basis of ethnic sentiments. It cannot be denied that certain 
discriminatory practices that lead to marginalization of individual groups provide the rationale behind the 
sentiments. That the Willink commission took the minority agitations seriously suggests that there were good 
reasons for a constitutional security for these minorities.  
Without further question, this paper assumes that the minority question has not been resolved. This is in view 
of the fact that state creation as advocated by groups like the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) and the 
Calabar, Ogoja, Rivers Movement and the Mid-West Movement has not taken care of minority dissatisfaction. A 
new look can be taken at minority agitations especially the fact of the evolution of the concept since ‘minority’ is 
acquiring new dimensions. As cultural groups, numerical majorities can be turned into political minorities. This is 
“minoritazation” of numerical majorities. The Ba Tutsi and the Ba-Hutu case in Rwanda is to the point. Geo-
locational marginalization can be included into such a rendering of certain places ‘minoritized’. In Nigeria, we can 
talk of the coastal regions (as majority locations) and the hinterland (as minority region). But most intriguing and 
unspoken case is the case of Nigeria West of the Niger (majority) and Nigeria East of the Niger (minority). The 
geo-locational equation is that the favoured locations enjoy the majority rights while the un-favoured suffer denial 
of such rights, numerical strength not-withstanding. 
 
2. Understanding the concepts of Minority and Development 
The two concepts are treated separately and distinctively to avoid confusion. How they connect is a matter for later 
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discussion. So, under here, we are not yet involved with understanding how minority connects to development. 
 
2.1 Minority 
This more or less statistical expression was hardly a theoretical matter, indeed it remains so unless taken as part of 
the pluralist argument. From that perspective of groups, even ethno-cultural, are classified into majority and 
minority. The politics of how these groups, majority, are reckoned with becomes significant. The minorities tend 
to suffer more deprivation when it comes to accessing the social or political rights. Often, the state has acted as 
the distributor of such privileges or rights. In the new states, especially of Asia, ethnic identity was actively used 
or created to serve administration. According to Meredith (1997, p.154), 
At the outset of colonial rule, administrators and ethnographers endeavoured to classify 
the people of Africa, sorting them out into what they called tribes, producing a whole 
new ethnic map to show the frontiers of each other. 
When it comes to privileges, they were given according to majority before the minorities. The abuse of this 
cultural status (majority and minority) became more annoying as applied by the colonialists. It has been observed 
that the greatest culprit in this abuse was the colonial administrator. “His abuse manifested in resource allocation 
and distribution of privileges” (Utume, 2013, p.82). 
Over the years, and especially in the new states of Africa, and perhaps Asia and Latin America, minority 
status has come to be identified with deprivation, denial of rights to such a group. In Africa, there is this tendency 
to render even numerical majorities inferior in terms of privileged distribution or in accessing of rights. For a long 
time, this situation obtained in Rwanda where the Tutsi minority enjoyed all the privileges of the state at the 
expense of the majority Hutu. This, as earlier observed was minorization of the Hutu. Ditto, apartheid South Africa 
where the numerical minority, (the whites), were “majorized” in the allocation of resources and privileges. This is 
no tutorial issue, more so that the space in political participation has often shrunk rather than expanded. Democracy 
which should open it up is hardly forth-coming. Thus so long as such deprivation and privileges define the nature 
of the relation between groups, so long shall the minority question become nagging to the national psyche. 
When situations like what we have attempted to describe obtain, the fear of domination, as it were, becomes 
a troubling one. Sometimes the distinctions are not necessarily cultural or ethnic. In Nigeria, that the majority 
Westernized South played a main role in how the country responded to the issue of independence (Crowder, 1978), 
is illustrative. Ironically, this problem of the privileged majority and a dominated deprived group, especially 
cultural, manifested in the regions themselves. It was also expected that it would be resolved after the Willink 
Commission report, even before self-rule would be given to Nigeria. It did not resolve it. So far, the minority fears 
have not been allayed despite the further creation of states out of the three regions. They have not enjoyed the 
rights they looked forward to enjoying in Nigeria’s effort at development. 
 
2.2 Development 
There are those who may feel that the debate about what is development is not yet closed. In 1994, in a faculty 
seminar, (Utume, 1994) drew the faculty’s attention to the fact that many scholars are seeing alternative paths to 
development besides Westernization or modernization. Indeed, Verhelst (1990) insisted that because non-Western 
cultures had their notions of economy, and development, they should search for their development in their roots. 
In the same seminar, it was suggested that modern Africa might start this journey in the persistence of African 
heritage (Utume, 2015). However, pointing to such alternative paths alone did not define development and this 
prompts the need to offer what may be considered the true meaning of development. 
Development has two ends to it- the physical and social. The most critical, however, is the social. This is 
because the social is made of the human activity that can transform the physical to achieve what man desires. This 
means man’s exploitation of the physical environment with all its endowments to serve his well-being. This much 
is what explanation Rodney (1972) offered. Concisely, this is about qualitative growth or expansion. We need to 
also add that development in this sense is a collective affair. Thus the expression social development or national 
development is conceptualized. Such realities modify the concept of development. This viewpoint contradicts the 
pure growth notion of development. Of course, in as much as growth alone does not qualify development, we 
cannot exclude it from conceptualizing development. In sum, this acknowledgement is worth nothing˸ 
Indeed the movement for development embodies a value judgment with which few would 
disagree, the desirability of overcoming malnutrition, poverty and disease which are the most 
immediate and widespread aspects of human suffering. In positive terms some advocate a 
commitment to development that transcends the limiting terms of economic growth to embrace 
such features of justice as quality of opportunity, full employment, generally available social 
services, equitable distribution of income and basic political freedoms. (Berstein, 1973, pp 13-
14) 
From the foregoing, it is clear that development is not an easy concept to capture even for what it is without 
the personal distortions that individual sentiments bring to hear. But it appears to have overcome such subjective 
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connotations as were initially brought to bear on its meaning. 
 
3. Minority rights and Development 
National development as a collective endeavour presupposes that it is better achieved through an inclusive social 
arrangement. Efforts should not be spared, so the energies of every member of the community. Of course, it 
connotes participatory involvement of all. Any measure of exclusion becomes detraction from that collective effort. 
To talk of minority rights is to enter the debate on the positives of pluralism. This is, to the extent to which a group, 
here, minority group, is allowed participation; to that extent would it be available for mobilization towards national 
development programmes and goals. Kwanashie (1997) has observed that ethnic groups, especially in the 
developing countries, are wont to base their development programme along the lines of identity groups. 
In virtually all developing societies, it has been observed that a regular pattern of collective 
action in the quest for material advancement within states has been along identity patterns. In 
fact, it has been the struggle for the advancement of material condition of groups and sub-groups 
within the state that has been influenced by ethnic on communal relations (Kwanashie, 1997, 
p.245  
It is clear from the foregoing that groups, including minorities, are important to the planning and mobilization 
towards national development. But such mobilization is only feasible if the group (minority in this case) enjoys 
the rights of participation, individually or collectively. Nkom (1997) has closely associated culture with 
development. He draws scholars’ and policymakers’ attention therefore to “the danger of treating culture and 
economic development as if they were separate and unrelated spheres in the overall struggle for economic 
development and national transformation” (Nkom, 1997, p.232).  It is the thesis he has argued through his chapter 
of the book. It needs to be further explained how it connects to our purpose. To talk of culture is to talk of identity 
groups. These may be ethnic nationalities. This directly brings minority into the argument. Minority rights 
anticipate the mobilization of such groups whose energies are needed at the point of planning for national 
programmes. We do not have all the time and space to provide greater details, but we hasten to add that countries 
that aspire to achieve higher development adopt integration policies which entail removing as much as possible, 
hindrances to group rights. These include minority rights. 
Young (1976) has been anxious to compare and discover similarities between Nigerian and Indian plural 
complexity. He went on to consider that these might achieve relative integration in their cultural diversity. He may 
be right in his optimism with the Indian case. He is very wrong in the case of Nigeria. For whereas India has been 
able to remove obstacles to group rights, Nigeria seems to be sinking deeper into the abyss of disunity despite the 
structural arrangement in the federation. For, India, the contrast with Nigeria is outstanding. Bahsin (1997) has 
given an account of the Indian experience with cultural diversity and how she has overcome the differences to 
achieve social integration and so develop. According to him, India achieved such integration through the clear 
vision of the national leaders who won independence from the British. They gave India the constitution that Indians 
desired. 
As a secular democracy, the constitution-assuring the dignity of individual and the unity of the nation-
constitutes the essence of these aspirations which brought together a vast multitude of humanity comprising diverse 
cultures, languages, religions and economic levels of living. Taking special care of the vulnerable and the weaker 
sections, the constitution propounds a set of guarantees of human rights and principles of state policy which 
embody the ends and means of the Indian vision (Bhasin, 1997, p.134). A country that is faithful to the rules and 
the means of securing such rights as India has done, will normally give confidence to all groups. They will be 
available for mobilization towards the national cause of development. It follows logically, that where the country 
does not secure the rights of its groups, development will be hard to achieve on account of unavailability of their 
energies and contributions.  
 
4. Minority Rights and Development in Nigeria 
According to Young (1979, p.276), “ethnicity, languages, region and religion interactively form Nigeria’s matrix 
of pluralism”. Different cultural groups, indeed ethnic nationalities, make up this matrix including minorities. 
What has Nigeria’s experience been, especially with minorities? 
As far as ethnic politics is concerned, (Nnoli, 1980), Nigeria is yet to be surpassed. For here, his point on the 
place of ethnic minorities is worth noting. First, apparent discrimination against them and fear of marginalization 
caused the response of the minorities. This statement captures it. The increasing rallying of each major ethnic 
group behind a political party, and the emphasis placed by Nigerian politicians on the pursuit of ethnic interest, 
raised fears among the leaders of the minority groups concerning neglect and domination by leaders of the major 
groups (Nnoli, 1980, p. 169). Second, inter-regional competition among the so-called ethnic majorities served not 
as examples to follow but was urged on by such ethnic majorities from other regions. It was part of the inter-
regional competition. 
This meant that the relative integration standard at the regional level, such as the Northernization of the North 
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or pan-Yoruba solidarity in the Western region (Young, 1979), pp. 276-281) would soon crumble in the face of 
such political awareness among the minorities of the regions. In the Eastern region, where no such effort occurred 
by way of incorporating the minorities, the break up was snappy and swift between the geo-political leaders and 
the Azikwe’s quarrel with Eyo Ita was quickly and easily turned into an Igbo-Efik standoff (Nnoli, 1980, pp. 168-
9). In the North, politicisation of minority agitations is captured in the formation of the United Middle Belt 
Congress (UMBC) and its agenda, the creation of a Middle Belt region. By extension, its view of the Nigerian 
Federation was in tandem with that of the National Independence Party (NIP). But, if we must take the issue of a 
balanced federation as a more principled stand to secure all people’s interest, the noble request had to be sacrificed 
on the altar of grand ethnic politics. The creation of the Mid-West region out of Western Nigeria in 1963 was most 
hypocritical. It was solely aimed at breaking up the base of the Action Group (AG). The Northern Region should 
have been the foremost candidate for dismemberment if there was any noble intention. Even the Eastern Region 
was sufficiently qualified to undergo such a surgery. It did not. That meant that the two members of the national 
coalition government of the Federation, Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and National Council of Nigerian 
Citizen (NCNC) were unscathed in the so-called act of balancing the federation. It was clearly a case of political 
mischief.  
The minority agitations, avoided solution in the Willink Commission of 1957, subsisted till 1967 when the 
civil war imposed another challenge of restructuring the federation. The twelve states structure imposed by the 
military administration in 1967 was also dishonest, though tactically sound for the containment of the Igbo Biafran 
scheme. It isolated them in the East Central state of the new federation. Indeed the minority grouse was not put in 
the front burner in this exercise. Since then, we have acquired a thirty-six states structure including a Federal 
Capital Territory, with our bag-full of minority complaints still subsisting. 
Restructuring and so balancing the federation was to secure the rights of all, but especially those of the 
minorities. It was not achieved in all the state creation exercises. It is one of the constitutional opportunities lost. 
Another area of failure, compared with India (Bahsin, 1997) has been the attitude to the constitutional provision 
for securing the rights of the citizens. The Nigerian constitution is indeed over-written. It attempts to cover every 
aspect of national life. Indeed, the best of its provisions are the fundamental objectives and directive principles of 
state policy. Again, in typical Nigerian hypocrisy to the protection of citizen rights, these are not justiceable. 
Leaders are not encouraged to defend these, neither are they dissuaded from abusing them. Nigerians are left to 
the whims and caprices of their leaders.  
As noted by Kwanashie (1997), when it comes to the distribution of resources and privileges, the minorities 
become the worse off for it. Moreover, leaders are by this act of disregard for the people as demonstrated in the 
constitution, left to their schemes. Public treasuries in Nigeria are now looted with reckless abandon. It all started 
with the rulership of General Ibrahim Babangida. It was in his reign that executive allowances were no longer 
accounted for in Nigeria. Public officers could now draw any amount from the public treasury, but for which they 
were not to give any account. Thus, from cabinet members to all public servants the morsel of office became juicier. 
This signalled the death of merit in holding public office and it sowed the seed of impunity. Those appointed were 
seen as given their share of the national cake, as one had to be reckoned with to get such an office. The minorities 
are held at the receiving end of this short stick. To further seal the reign of public misdemeanour, Babangida 
introduced Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). It introduced a national culture that threw overboard any 
ethics in public service. This was the era in which every public officer especially military in high places was a 
bank owner. These banks bought dollars cheap from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and sold them high at the 
foreign exchange markets. It caused the run on the Naira, besides increasing Nigeria’s debt burden. The loans 
obtained under SAP attached especially high interest rates. This is where irrational or at best selfish politics and 
poor governance has taken the Nigerian nation. The minority has lost his rights of participation, and even of voicing 
out under the circumstances. He has been effectively marginalized, nay excluded. 
With the coming of the Fourth Republic, another aspect of this behaviour has been born. It is the culture of 
impunity. Rigging into public offices has become common. Ordinary Nigerians have lost confidence in the 
institutions of governance, starting with the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Moreover, 
whoever rigs in an election is likely to lead a government that is illegitimate; he can hardly call on honest Nigerians 
to help in the task of governance, except those as roguish as himself. For the highly educated, even the idea of the 
state is sneered at. They become indifferent to public affairs including elections (Utume and Shima, 2012). This 
intellectual aloofness alienates the group which becomes excluded from Nigeria’s public affairs. The group 
becomes “minoritized”. The point of blocking minority participation and so excluding them from the process of 
national development is thus established. A kind of “minoritoization” is contrived to worsen the case of minority 
exclusion. For example, through-out the administration of Goodluck Jonathan, the Tiv, traditionally reckoned to 
be the fifth largest ethnic group in Nigeria were systematically excluded from certain positions. A glaring case is 
the twenty-six man committee constituted to advice Jonathan. No Tiv man was represented on it. Perhaps some 
other groups have suffered such “minoritazation” in Nigeria. This damages the development efforts of Nigeria. 
In January 2014, an Ethnic Nationalities Movement (EMM) was announced. It called for an ethnic 
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Nationalities National Conference for 11th and 12th February in Abuja. What was interesting about the document 
it published was the listing of three hundred and eighty-nine (389) ethnic nationalities. Of this number, only the 
Fulani, Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba have been held to be majority ethnic groups. That means the remaining three 
hundred and eighty five (385) have been treated as minorities. The impression cannot be mistaken that a good 
number of the Nigerian population is excluded from mainstream public affairs of Nigeria. And the concept of 
minority itself becomes questionable as it verges on irrationality. This is because between majority and minority 
ethnics there is no threshold. 
Table 1 in this write-up attempts to capture the figures by reducing the states’ classification into majority, 
minority and mixed populations. The original three regions of Nigeria are used to classify the majority ethnic 
groups, the East for Igbo, North for Hausa-Fulani and the West for Yoruba, Kwara State is included here as Yoruba. 
The remaining states are classified into minority and mixed. The FCT and Lagos are classified as mixed because 
as political and commercial headquarters respectively, they are not exclusive to Gbagyi (Gwari) or Yoruba. 
Table 1.  State classification according to dominant ethnic nationalities of Nigeria using census figures of 
2006 
Classification Population Total  
A      Hausa/Fulani   
Jigawa  4,348,649  
Kano 9,383,682  
Katsina 5,792,578  
Sokoto 3,696,999  
Zamfara  3,259,846 26,481,754 
B       Igbo                                                               
Abia  2833999  
Anambra 4182032  
Ebonyi 2173501  
Enugu 3257298  
Imo  3934899 16, 381,729 
 C       Yoruba  
Ekiti 2384212  
Kwara 2371089  
Ogun 3728098  
Ondo 3441024  
Osun 3423535  
Oyo  5591589 20,939, 547 
D          Minority  
Akwa-Ibom 3920208  
Bayelsa 1,703,358  
Benue 4,219,244  
Borno 4,151,193  
Cross River 2,888,966  
Delta 4,098,391  
Edo  3,218,332  
Kogi  3,278,487  
Nasarawa  1,863,275  
Niger  3,950,249  
Plateau  3,178,172  
Rivers  5,185,400  
Taraba  2,300736  
Yobe  2,321,591 46,278,142 
E              Mixed  
Adamawa 3,168,101  
Bauchi 4,676,465  
FCT 1,405,201  
Gombe 2,353,879  
Kaduna 6,066,562  
Kebbi 2,238,628  
Lagos 9,013,534 29,922,370 
Grand Total  140,003,542 
Source: Extractions from the Annual Abstract of Statistics, 2008, Published by the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
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Some statements of clarification need to be made about the classificatory scheme in table 1. First, it is 
admissible that Hausa/Fulani is not a name for a group; it is forged to account for the two distinctive nationalities 
of Fulani and Hausa who happen to be found in the same location of the far north, Nigeria. It is an expression of 
convenience.  It might also be observed that what has transpired between the two cultural groups is interesting 
sociologically. The two have achieved a peculiar case of acculturation, where the Fulani have succeeded to impose 
their rule over the Hausa, but the latter have succeeded in imposing a cultural identity over the Fulani, not only by 
their mode of dressing but especially in their language.  
By the classification in Table 1, no single ethnic group is comparable to the so called minorities if put together. 
Indeed, the so-called majority are individually minorities to the rest of the Nigerian population. On the other hand, 
to marginalize 46,278,142 Nigerians in the name of minority politics is to do damage to Nigeria’s human resources. 
This is to say that more than one third of the 140,003,542 total is not participating in Nigeria’s development effort. 
It is no wonder that Nigeria has had a poor record regarding development. On the other hand, India which started 
at the same level with Nigeria has overcome ethnicity and other cultural complexities to advance as much as she 
has (Bahsin, 1997). 
Table 2 Results of Nigeria’s Presidential Elections 1999-2019 
Classsification            1999                 2003                2007        2011                  2015                    2019 
A       Hausa/Fulani 
Jigawa  548,596 1,101,909 N/A 1,140,766 1,037,564 1,106,244 
Kano 904, 713  2,172,182 N/A 2,673,228 2,128,821 1,891,134 
Katsina 1, 193,397 1,653,161 N/A 1,639,532 1,449,426 1,555,473 
Sokoto 354, 427 929,085 N/A 909,808 834,259 871,891 
Zamfara  380,079 1,053,851 N/A 942,679 761,022 578,439 
Total                      3,381,212           6,910,188                         7,306,013         6,211,092               6,003,181 
B   Igbo 
Abia  535, 918 748, 034 N/A 1,188,333 392, 045 323,291 
Anambra 833,278 862, 193 N/A 1,157,239 688,584 605,734 
Ebonyi 345,921 796,626 N/A 502,890 363,888 359,131 
Enugu 835,586 1,126,945 N/A 814,009 573,173 421,014 
Imo  736,306 1,016,481 N/A 1,409,850 702,954 511,586 
Total                           3,287,009        4,550,279                          5,072,321      2,720,644 2,220,756 
C  Yoruba 
Ekiti 713, 690 325,881 N/A 261,858 300,691 381,132 
Kwara 659, 598 574,369 N/A 414,754 440,080 459,676 
Ogun 475, 904 1,361,251 N/A 543,715 533,172 564,256 
Ondo 801, 797 888, 863 N/A 486,837 561,056 555,994 
Osun 854, 639 611,593 N/A 512,714 642,615 714,682 
Oyo  921, 178 882,5O71 N/A 863,544 881,352 836,531 
Total                       4,426,806            4,644,528                      3,083,422        3,358,966               3,512,271 
D     Minority 
Akwa-Ibom 883, 278 1,292,395 N/A 1,232,395 1,017,064 578,775 
Bayelsa 610, 032 738,165 N/A 506,693 367,067 321,767 
Benue 1,252,957 1,213,843. N/A 1,047,709 683,264 728,912 
Borno 915,975 1,120,152 N/A 1,177,646 501,920 919,786 
Cross River 876, 156 1,233,321 N/A 726,341 450,514 421,901 
Delta 816,574 1,142,622 N/A 1,410,379 1,267,773 829,762 
Edo  679,784 1,106,812 N/A 621,192 500,451 560,711 
Kogi  984,710 863,989 N/A 561,782 421,328 521,016 
Nasarawa  397,008 729,266 N/A 694,527 511,547 580,778 
Niger  871, 130 983,206 N/A 1,019,167 813,671 851,937 
Plateau  672,442 1,050,370 N/A 1,411,117 982,388 1,034,853 
Rivers  1, 656,603 2,160,133 N/A 1,854,11 1,565,461 642,165 
Taraba  871, 039 906,069 N/A 739,065 579,677 712,877 
Yobe  311,578 599,131 N/A 622,115 473,796 559,365 
Total                        11,799,266         15,139,474                      11,955,539         10,135,921         9,264,605 
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Classsification            1999                 2003                2007        2011                  2015                    2019 
E      Mixed 
Adamawa 845,107 955,847 N/A 907,706 636,018 811,534 
Bauchi 1,176,542 1,680,542 N/A 1,610,094 1,020,338 1,024,307 
FCT 99, 022 261,163 N/A 398,094 306,805 421,014 
Gombe 844, 539 976,136 N/A 770,019 460,599 554,203 
Kaduna 1,676, 029 1,918,365 N/A 2,569,963 1,617,482 1,663,603 
Kebbi 512,229 815,219 N/A 924,099 677,005 756,605 
Lagos  1,751,981 1,628,748 N/A 1,945,044 1,443,686 1,089,567 
Total 6,905,449 8,236,020  9,125,019  6,161,933     6,320,833 
Grand Total            29,799,742        39,012,071                         36,542,314     28,587,564           25,321,646 
Source:  Nigerian Independent National Electoral Commission  
Tables 2 and 3 present an “embarrassment of riches” as it were. That is as it should be for any authentic 
statistical representation. Table 2 is of the raw figures of the various presidential elections while table 3 captures 
the percentages of the figures. The two tables are figures for the voter turn-outs for the elections. Those for 2007 
are not available because the INEC did not disaggregate the votes according to the states of the federation as done 
with the results of all the other elections We should not however be carried away by the other facts of the statistics 
such as the fluctuation and/or decline in electoral figures of given regions. The Igbo region, the Yoruba region and 
the minority regions have all registered a decline in electoral turnout by their percentages. Curiously, the Hausa 
/Fulani have witnessed a steady growth in this regard. Only the mixed group has held a fairly steady (though 
slightly fluctuating) percentages of the voter turn-out. It is no place for us to hypothesize on what explains this 
though it might make an interesting matter for further analysis. 
What remains of interest to us in this study is the fact that the so-called minorities as a group have always 
constituted a significant proportion the Nigerian population. This is what is even reflected in figures of the voter 
turn-out. It is the only group if combined with the mixed group has always added to more than 50% voter turn-out 
of the country. 
Table 3.  Distribution of votes according to ethnic classifications % 
Classification  1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019 
Hausa/Fulani 11.3 17.50 N/A 19.99 21.73 21.97 
Igbo 11.0 11.53 N/A 13.88 9.52 8.13 
Yoruba 14.86 11.76 N/A 8.44 11.75 12.86 
Minority 39.59 38.35 N/A 32.72 35.45 33.91 
Mixed 23.17 20.86 N/A 24.97 21.55 23.13 
Total 100 100 N/A 100 100 100 
(Additional Analysis) 
 
5. Looking Ahead 
If Nigeria must sincerely tackle her development problems, one of the ways must be to attend to the grievances of 
the minorities. These are numerous, they are natural and they are artificial. That Nigeria has such a multitude of 
ethnic nationalities is natural, but that the ethnic differences have been politicised is definitely artificial. Then there 
is the problem that ethnic politics has raised ethnic awareness to a point that renders the problems of ethnicity 
nearly insurmountable. The widespread sub-national agitations in Nigeria are a result of this level of ethnic 
awareness. With sufficient awareness each ethnic group has one grudge or other against the state or another group. 
But this is not to say we should give up on this. To solve a problem one must know and acknowledge the energies 
required to solve it. We acknowledge the difficulties in that spirit. These facts should help us contemplate the 
solutions. 
To confront the problem of meeting minority demands Nigeria must engage social engineering. This means 
tinkering with the state structure.  To renew how Nigerians relate with one another, the institutions of governance 
need to be reviewed. For example, Nigerian legislatures enjoy questionable privileges. There is no basis for making 
them permanent. Part-time legislative bodies should be far cheaper. There is no reason not to make them part-time. 
Closely related is the modality for representation, or recruitment to political positions. National electoral bodies, 
such as INEC, or state electoral bodies such as obtain now in Nigeria are misguided agencies. The one-size-fits-
all approach is unhelpful. One date is declared for election into certain offices like the presidency, governorship, 
and legislative seats. Every cultural group is subjected to the same rules, not minding any cultural value orientation 
or variation. This arrangement should be reviewed to ensure that each ethnic group adopts their independent mode 
of selection or election. A constitutional provision should grant every nationality the number to be elected to public 
offices, such as the legislatures. Coupled with this, proportional representation should be incorporated and the 
winner-takes-all mode of election should be jettisoned. It might not be necessary to go the whole hog in adopting 
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what Lijphat (1977) would describe as ‘consociational democracy’ because it too poignantly recommends elite 
dominance ‘political corporation, of the segmental elites’. Its recognition and accommodation of segmental 
pluralism is quite appealing, on the other hand, however. 
The essence of these recommendations is to rekindle the interest of the minorities. The new arrangement 
purports to shed off opportunism of public office, but instead to promote equity in group representation. In the end, 
the minority will breathe the air of accommodation and avail themselves for participation in public affairs. It is a 
sure way of recovering the energies of this large portion of the Nigeria population for national transformation 
described earlier as qualitative expansion in all spheres of life. 
 
6. Conclusion  
We have argued that all social groups need to be allowed participation in public affairs so as to harness their 
energies for development. Denial of rights is often the first step to blocking such participation and further 
dampening the enthusiasm of those affected. Even if they do not actively subvert efforts at any level towards 
development, their withdrawal or exclusion is sufficient to damage efforts at the national programme of 
development. 
In Nigeria, the so-called minorities have not been properly accommodated. The colonial administrators started 
it all. Apart from attempting to segregate and suppress those they saw as ethnic minorities, they set enterprising 
ones against each other – the so – called divide and rule tactics. At independence the national leaders did not have 
the vision to dismantle these structures of discrimination among ethnic nationalities-what worked much against 
the interest of minorities as pawns on their political chess board, with the level of corruption in public office since 
SAP and the institution of political corruption in office. Since civil rule from 1999, things have worked dangerously 
to further isolate or exclude the minorities. But the minorities together constitute a population of Nigeria that 
cannot be ignored, if Nigeria hopes to achieve development. Bandying together against the majorities may be only 
reactionary. But the minorities should voice out for a review of the constitution to turn things around.  They need 
this political space, not only for their own sakes, but also for that of the national project as well. 
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